Dynamic Market for Lemons with Endogenous Quality Choice by the Seller by Kawai, Keiichi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Dynamic Market for Lemons with
Endogenous Quality Choice by the Seller
Keiichi Kawai
2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29688/
MPRA Paper No. 29688, posted 19. March 2011 16:27 UTC
Dynamic Market for Lemons with Endogenous
Quality Choice by the Seller∗
Keiichi Kawai†
October 2010
Abstract
We analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is
endogenously determined by the seller. Potential buyers sequentially submit offers
to one seller. The seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the
item at the beginning of the game, which is unobservable to buyers. At the interim
stage of the game, the information and payoff structures are the same as in the
market for lemons. Our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create
any efficiency gain if (i) the common discounting is low, and (ii) the static incentive
constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex-ante contract under which the trade
happens with probability one. Our result does not depend on whether the offers by
buyers are private or public.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a situation in which one player (seller) invests in an asset that
she may sell to another player (from among potential buyers) who cannot observe the
investment decision by the seller. Should trade occur, it occurs so before the value of the
asset is fully known to the potential buyers. This trading opportunity, therefore, creates
a moral hazard problem on the seller’s investment decision. In other words, there is a
trade-off between (i) the ex-ante efficiency, i.e., the incentive to invest, and (ii) the ex-post
efficiency, i.e., the higher probability of trade when there is an efficiency gain from such
trade.
Economic situations that exhibit the feature described above abound. For example,
the current subprime crisis has proven that the securitization process reduced the in-
centives of financial intermediaries to carefully screen borrowers. In this setting, the
seller is the originator of the loan, and the buyers are the potential investors. Evaluation
and screening of the quality of the loan applicant usually involve collecting both “hard”
information, such as the credit score, and “soft” information such as the impression
held by the loan officer of the borrower’s honesty, creditworthiness, and likelihood to
defaulting. The fact that investors purchase securitized loans based on hard information
reduces the incentive to collect soft information. In other words, the securitization has
an adverse effect on the ex-ante screening effort of loan originators. This lax screening
results in a large increase in low-quality securitized loans. In fact, Keys, Mukherjee,
Seru, and Vig (2010) have found empirically that conditional on being securitized, the
portfolio which is easier to securitize defaults by around 10 to 25 percent more often
than a similar risk profile group which is harder to securitize.
As another example, consider the founder of a start-up company. Naturally, she is
better informed about the company’s fundamental than is the market. On any given day,
she always has the option of selling the company, even though there may be no reason
that actually forces her to do so on that day. With every passing day that she retains
ownership, she gains one day’s profit.
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One question that naturally arises here is whether the possibility of trade contributes
to the social welfare. While trade creates the efficiency gain, it also creates ex-ante
inefficiency due to the moral hazard problem. By analyzing a dynamic market for
lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller, we show that the possibility of
trade does not create any efficiency gain if (i) the common discounting is low, and (ii)
the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex-ante contract under
which trade happens with probability one.
At the interim stage of the game, the information and payoff structures are as in the
market for lemons in Akerlof (1970). One seller is better informed than the potential
buyers about the value of the single unit for sale. It is common knowledge that trade
is mutually beneficial. More precisely, the item creates a flow payoff every period. The
flow payoff is higher when it is in the hands of one of buyers than in the seller’s hands.
The potential buyers identically value the unit. The seller bargains sequentially with one
of the potential buyers until an agreement is reached, if ever, and delay is costly. When
it is his turn, a buyer (an uninformed party) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller.
The novel feature of our model is that the seller’s “type,” i.e., the value of the item
is an endogenous variable. More precisely, at the beginning of the game, the seller can
make a costly investment that increases the value of the item. The potential buyers also
benefit from the investment if the good is in their hands. However, the unobservability
and the unverifiability of the seller’s action, as well as the resulting quality of the item,
create a moral hazard problem. In fact, if trade (with a high price) is sure to happen,
then the seller does not have any incentive to make a costly investment at all. On the
other hand, if trade always fails to happen, then the seller will invest for her own benefit.
Therefore, without any pre-agreed contract, the only incentive that induces the seller to
invest is the possibility of no trade, i.e., ex-post inefficiency. In other words, the game
considered in this paper entails trade-off between (i) creating the ex-ante incentive for
the investment, which increases the potential efficiency gain, and (ii) achieving (ex-post)
efficient trade.
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Despite the moral hazard problem, the seller makes the investment with a positive
probability in any equilibrium. Nevertheless, the social welfare without any trade is
idential to the social welfare with trade (under any equilibrium) if (i) the common dis-
counting is low, and (ii) the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable
ex-ante contract under which trade occurs with probability one. More precisely, no
matter whether the previous offers are public or private, (i) the seller’s ex-ante payoff is
equal to her payoff from investing and retaining the good to herself, and (ii) all buyers’
ex-ante payoffs are zero. Our result is not an asymptotic property.
The first-best outcome of the game is that the seller makes the investment with
probability one, and trade occurs with the first buyer. One might expect that the result
will be that the first-best is asymptotically attainable, i.e., that the result is like the
conjecture in Coase (1972). 1)
We shall see, however that the seller invests with a positive probability but not
with one, and that trade fails to happen with a positive probability (even at the limit
where the discounting is taken to be zero) in any equilibrium. The intuition behind this
result is as follows: First, recall that some degree of ex-post inefficiency is needed to
induce the seller to invest. Therefore, a positive level of investment necessarily entails a
positive probability of failure in trade. This also implies that the seller does not invest
with probability one in the equilibrium. Because if she does, then trade happens with
probability one with the first buyer, which contradicts the previous claim. Second, if it is
known that the seller never invests, then potential buyers never offer a high price. Then,
the seller deviates to invest at the beginning of the game and retains the good to herself.
Lastly, since the seller does not have any bargaining power, the seller’s payoff is driven
down to her reservation value, i.e., the payoff she earns by investing and keeping the
item.
1)In dynamic hold-up literature, the first-best result is asymptotically attainable when (i) investment
pays off only if the trade occurs and (ii) uninformed player (single player) repeatedly makes offers (See
Gul (2001) and Lau (2008).) Neither assumption is satisfied in our model.
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Suppose that there is only one buyer instead of an infinite number of potential buyers.
Then the buyer has all the bargaining power in our framework. In this case, the seller
who did not make any investment accepts a low price offer if it exceeds her reservation
value. Since the buyer’s reservation value always exceeds that of the seller, the buyer
can earn a positive level of payoff by trading with the seller who did not invest. This
also determines the social welfare under the second-best outcome when the buyer has
all the bargaining power.
When there are future buyers, however, the seller who did not invest does not have
any incentive to accept an offer that exceeds her reservation value but is not high because
she may receive a high offer in the future. This competition among buyers is what drives
the buyers’ ex-ante payoff to zero.
The interim stage of our game is a dynamic adverse selection problem. There are a
number of related papers in the literature. Among others, Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) is
closely related to ours.2) It demonstrates that if the probability that the seller has a high-
quality good is strictly below a certain threshold, then there is an equilibrium in which
the bargaining ends up in an impasse when the offers are public, but no such an impasse
occurs when the offers are private. When the offers are public, the seller can send a
signal that she has invested by rejecting a high offer. In fact, the seller will reject even an
offer that exceeds the offer expected in the future (on the equilibrium path) because her
rejecting such an offer sends a signal that the good she owns is of high quality.
As a result, an impasse is likely to result when the offers are public.3) In contrast, when
the probability that the seller has a high-quality good is weakly above the threshold, then
trade happens with the first buyer with probability one whether the offer is public or
private.
As we shall show, however, when the seller’s type is endogenous, the probability
2)Other related works include Janssen and Roy (2002), Taylor (1999), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Hendel,
Lizzeri, and Siniscalchi (2005).
3)Note that although public offers might transmit finer information than private offers do, they do not
do this in any equilibrium.
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that the seller owns a high-quality good (i.e., the probability that the seller makes the
investment) will be exactly at the threshold. The intuition is quite simple. If the buyers
believe that the seller invests with a very high probability, then the high price is offered
at the first period. The seller, therefore, loses the incentive to invest. On the other
hand, if the potential buyers initially believe that the seller does not invest with a high
probability, then the payoff of the seller who does not invest is strictly below her payoff
by investing (and not trading). However, if this really is the case, then the seller prefers
to invest.
Moreover, we show that the buyers’ beliefs stay at this level all the time, i.e., there is
no screening on the equilibrium path no matter whether the offers are public or private.
This is why our result does not depend on whether the offers are public or private.
Ho¨rner and Vieille (2009) assume that potential buyers do not receive any signal about
the quality of the item. A effects of public news in a dynamic market for lemons with
private offers is analyzed in Daley and Green (2010). They show that the equilibrium
involves periods of no trade, which ends either when enough good news arrives resulting
in immediate trade; or when bad news arrives resulting in partial sell-off of low-value
assets.
The dynamic adverse selection problem in all the aforementioned papers is exoge-
nous, i.e., the seller’s type is exogenous. There are, however, many situations in which
the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller as we have discussed
above. This paper takes a first step into endogenizing the quality of the good in the
market for lemons.
Since the setting of this paper can be interpreted as bargaining that takes place in
a market, this paper is also related to the literature on bargaining with interdependent
values. In fact, our result is reminiscent of the result in the literature on bargaining
with interdependent values.4) Deneckere and Liang (2006) characterize the stationary
equilibrium of the game between one seller and one buyer with equal discount factors in
4)See also Evans (1989) and Vincent (1989).
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which the uninformed party (i.e., the buyer) makes all the offers. The limiting bargaining
outcome involves agreement but delay, and fails to be the second-best result. Our paper
differs from theirs in that the seller’s “type” is endogenous; and, instead of one buyer
who keeps making offers until an agreement is reached, there is an infinite number of
potential buyers and each buyer can make an offer only once.
Another paper related to ours, which represents a third dimension of the relevant
literature, is Hermalin (2010). In it, Hermalin considers the optimal ex-ante contract –
which is not renegotiation-proof – between one seller and one buyer in which the seller
endogenously chooses the quality of the good (a static version of our game), and shows
that the possible efficiency gains depends on who has the bargaining power. In fact, if the
seller has the bargaining power, she can signal the quality of the good via her offer. As a
result the efficiency gain can be larger when the seller has all the bargaining power than
when the buyer has all the bargaining power. But there is a continuum of (belief-driven)
equilibria in the game where the seller has all the bargaining power. One equilibrium
among those - the worst equilibrium - shares the key properties of the equilibrium of
our model, i.e., the ex-ante probability of trade, the probability of investment, and the
efficiency gain.
The model is described in section two. In section three, we analyze the benchmark
case in which there is only one buyer. We then provide our main result in section four.
The discussion and concluding remarks are found in section five, and the proofs are
found in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic game between (i) a single (female) seller s with one unit of an
indivisible good for sale, and (ii) a countably infinite number of potential (male) buyers,
{bt}∞t=1, or buyers for short. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, · · · . At period
t = 1, 2, · · · , the seller is matched with a buyer bt, and they bargain over the price at
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which to trade the good according to the procedure described later.
The seller receives a flow payoff (1 − δ) vs0 = 0 at each period t = 1, 2, · · · from the good
if she owns it. The seller discounts the future payoff by a discount factor δ. Therefore,
the reservation value of the good to the seller is vs0. At the beginning of period 1, and
only then, the seller can make an irreversible investment to boost the value of the good
to her. We denote the investment decision by I ∈ {0, 1}, where I = 0 and 1 represent
the “no investment” and the “investment” decisions respectively. If the seller chooses
I = 1, the flow payoff to her increases to (1 − δ) vs1, but she incurs the one time private
cost c ∈
(
0, vs1
)
at t = 1. The seller’s choice of I is her private information. Since the
investment increases the reservation value of the good to vs1 and since v
s
1 − c > vs0 = 0, the
seller prefers to invest if she knows that she will retain the good in the future.
If the good is in a buyer’s hands, he receives (1 − δ) vbI every period when the seller’s
investment decision is I ∈ {0, 1}. The buyer is also assumed to discount the future payoff
by the same discount factor δ. Therefore, the value of the good to a buyer is vbI when she
knows the seller’s investment decision is I. The investment increases the quality of the
good, i.e., vb1 > v
b
0.
We assume that both trade and the investment are always mutually beneficial:
1. The buyers always value the good higher than the seller does, i.e., vbI > v
s
I .
2. It is socially optimal that the seller makes the investment and trade occurs, i.e.,
vb1 − vs1 − c > max
{
vb0 − vs0, vs1 − c
}
.
We only consider the case where there is no mutually agreeable contract under which
trade happens with probability one, i.e., vs1 − c > vb0. Note that if there exists a contract
under which trade happens with probability one, the seller never invests. Therefore, if
the above condition is violated (i.e., vs1−c ≤ vb0), then the seller and the first buyer can agree
on a contract under which the first buyer is required to pay some price p ∈
[
vs1 − c, vb0
]
upon the delivery of the good. However, if vs1 − c > vb0, then no such price exists.
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The game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of t = 1, the seller decides whether or
not she will invest. After the investment decision is made, the seller meets the first buyer
b1. Without knowing the seller’s investment decision, b1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
p1 ≥ 0 to the seller. If the seller accepts the offer, then the agreement is struck and trade
occurs. When the investment that the seller has chosen is I, the payoffs of the seller and
the buyer b1, evaluated at t = 1, are p1 − Ic, and vbI − p1, respectively. If the seller rejects
the price offer, the game proceeds to the next period.
At the beginning of each period t = 2, 3, · · · , the seller meets the t-th buyer, bt, if trade
did not occur by the end of period t − 1. Then buyer bt makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
pt ≥ 0. In the private-offer case, bt cannot observe any of the previous offers. On the
other hand, if the offers are public, bt can observe all the previous offers that have been
rejected by the seller. If the seller accepts the offer by bt, then the agreement is struck
and trade occurs at period t. If the seller rejects the price offer at t, the game proceeds to
t + 1, and the seller negotiates with a new buyer.
Note that under autarky, i.e., when trade is “prohibited” or impossible, the seller
makes the investment at t = 1 and earns ex-ante payoff of vs1−c > 0 (and all buyers’ ex-ante
payoffs are zero). Hence if we define the social welfare as the sum of all players’ ex-ante
payoffs, then the social welfare under autarky is vs1−c. When trade is possible, all players
are weakly better off. We define the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade
(denoted by E) as the difference between the the social welfare under the equilibrium
and the social welfare under autarky. Note that E ∈
[
0, vb1 −
(
vs1 − c
)]
. Then the efficiency
gain E can be decomposed into (i) the gain from trade, and (ii) the loss from the higher
probability of there being a lemon. To see this, let σ be the probability that the seller
chooses I = 1, and pii be the probability that trade occurs when the seller chooses I = i.
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Then,
E = σ
(
pi1vb1 + (1 − pi1) vs1 − c
)
+ (1 − σ)
(
pi0vb0 + (1 − pi0) vs0
)
−
(
vs1 − c
)
= σα1
(
vb1 − vs1
)
+ (1 − σ)pi0
(
vb0 − vs0
)
︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
gain (i)
− (1 − σ)
(
vs1 − c − vs0
)
︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
loss (ii)
. (1)
Let G ≡ σα1
(
vb1 − vs1
)
+ (1 − σ)pi0
(
vb0 − vs0
)
and L ≡ (1 − σ)
(
vs1 − c − vs0
)
. As it is clear
from (1), the gain from trade G is increasing in σ and in pii. As we shall see, however,
the increase in the probability of trade, i.e., the increase in pii, creates the moral hazard
problem. As a result, the probability of investment σ becomes smaller, and hence, the
larger value of L results.
3 Benchmark Case
In this section, we consider a benchmark case in which δ = 0. The situation can also be
interpreted as the game with δ ∈ (0, 1) in which there is only one potential buyer, b1, and
as a result, b1 has all the bargaining power. The objective is to show that (i) the first-best
outcome is unattainable in this game due to the moral hazard problem; (ii) the efficiency
gain created by the possibility of trade is nevertheless strictly positive when the buyer
has all the bargaining power; and (iii) the existence of trade-off between creating the ex-
ante incentive for the investment (ex-ante efficiency) and achieving a higher probability
of trade (ex-post efficient trade).
Theorem 1 When δ = 0, there exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
1. the seller chooses I = 1 with probability σ∗, and I = 0 with probability 1 − σ∗, where
σ∗ = vs1/v
b
1 ∈ (0, 1);
2. the buyer offers p = vs1 with probability α
∗, and p = vs0 = 0 with probability 1 − α∗, where
α∗ =
(
vs1 − c
)
/vs1 ∈ (0, 1); and
3. the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade E is
(
1 − vs1/vb1
)
vb0 > 0.
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Proof. In the Appendix.
Recall that the first-best outcome of the game is that the seller makes the investment
with probability one, and trade happens with probability one at t = 1. The theorem above
shows that the first-best outcome is not attainable due to the moral hazard problem.
Nevertheless, the seller invests with a positive probability, and trade happens with a
positive probability. Furthermore, the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade
is positive. In other words, both G and L are positive because σ = σ∗, pi0 = 1, and pi1 = α∗,
but G > L.
Note that p = 0 is offered with a positive probability in the equilibrium. This low
offer plays two key roles. First, the low offer mitigates the moral hazard problem. If the
seller chooses I = 0 and faces p = 0, then the seller’s ex-post payoff is zero. If the seller
has chosen I = 1 instead, she rejects the offer and can earn vs1 − c by retaining the good.
Therefore, the possibility of this low offer creates an incentive to invest ex-ante, i.e., it
induces higher ex-ante efficiency. On the other hand, the seller who has chosen I = 1
does not accept the low offer and decides to retains the good. Therefore, even though
trade is mutually beneficial at some price p ∈
[
vs1, v
b
1
]
, trade fails to occur. As a result, the
low offer which created the incentive to invest also creates the ex-post inefficiency.
As we have seen above, the benchmark case analysis reveals that the game considered
in this paper entails trade-off between (i) creating the ex-ante incentive for the invest-
ment, which increases the potential efficiency gain, and (ii) achieving (ex-post) efficient
trade. The objective of the following section is to examine the effect of competition
among buyers on this trade-off, which in turn changes the probability of investment, the
probability of trade, and the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade.
4 Analysis
In this section, we consider the case in which the seller meets with a new buyer if no
trade has yet occurred. In such a situation, a buyer “competes” with future potential
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buyers, and thus a particular buyer’s bargaining power will now be weaker. In fact, the
seller who has chosen I = 0 does not accept p1 = 0 any more. We show that when the
common discount factor is close to one, the efficiency gain created by the possibility of
trade is zero, i.e., E = 0. This result does not depend on whether the offers are private or
public.
Assumption 1 The common discount factor is close to one: δ >
vb0
vs1−c .
4.1 Private-Offer Case
First, we consider the private-offer case. Since the offer is private, bt cannot observe the
offers that are rejected at τ ≤ t − 1. A few definitions are now required. Let µt be bt’s
posterior belief assigned to the seller who has chosen I = 1. Let σ˜ be bt’s belief at which
he is indifferent between offering vs1 and 0, i.e., σ˜v
b
1 + (1 − σ˜) vb0 − vs1 = 0. In other words,
σ˜ is defined as σ˜ ≡ vs1−vb0
vb1−vb0
. We first show that there exists an equilibrium in which the
efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero. Consider the following pair of
strategies and buyers’ beliefs:
• At any t, µt = σ˜; and bt offers either vs1 with probability α (δ) ≡
(1−δ)(vs1−c)
(1−δ)vs1+cδ or zero
with probability (1 − α (δ)).
• At any t,
– the seller who has chosen I = 1 accepts pt with probability one if and only if
pt ≥ vs1, and rejects any pt < vs1 with probability one.
– the seller who has chosen I = 0 accepts pt with probability one if and only if
pt ≥ δ
(
vs1 − c
)
, and rejects any pt < δ
(
vs1 − c
)
with probability one.
To see why this is an equilibrium, note that the ex-ante probability that the seller
receives offer vs1 is
α(δ)
1−(1−α(δ))δ =
vs1−c
vs1
. Therefore, the ex-ante payoff from not investing is
α(δ)
1−(1−α(δ))δv
s
1 = v
s
1 − c, that is, the seller is indifferent between investing and not investing.
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Furthermore, at any point, the discounted value of the future offers (in expectation) is
δ
(
vs1 − c
)
. This is the maximum payoff the seller who has chosen I = 0 can gain by
rejecting the current offer. Therefore, the seller’s actions are optimal. As for the buyers,
if bt’s offer is accepted only by the seller who has chosen I = 0, then such an offer is in[
δ
(
vs1 − c
)
, vs1
)
. However, bt’s reservation value for the item with I = 0 is vb0 < δ
(
vs1 − c
)
.
Hence bt’s actions are optimal.
The equilibrium described above exhibits the following properties: (i) the seller’s
ex-ante payoff is vs1 − c, and (ii) the buyers’ ex-ante payoffs are zero. Therefore, (iii)
the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero, (iv) the ex-ante probability
of the investment is σ˜ ∈ (0, 1), and (v) the ex-ante probability of trade is vs1−cvs1 ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, the probability that trade occurs within any given finite period converges
to zero as δ→ 1.
The equilibrium is not unique in general, but we show that every equilibrium exhibits
properties (i) to (v).
Theorem 2 Suppose the buyers’ offers are private. Then every equilibrium satisfies the following
properties: (i) the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero, (ii) the ex-ante
probability of investment is
vs1−vb0
vb1−vb0
, and (iii) the ex-ante probability of trade is
vs1−c
vs1
.
4.2 Public-Offer Case
In this subsection, we consider the case in which bt, t ≥ 2 can observe all the previous
offers that have been rejected. It is not hard to see that there exists an equilibrium such
that on the equilibrium path bt offers either vs1 with probability α (δ) ≡
(1−δ)(vs1−c)
(1−δ)vs1+cδ or zero
with probability (1 − α (δ)); and trade occurs if and only if vs1 is offered.
As in the private-offer case, the equilibrium described above exhibits the following
properties: (i) The seller’s ex-ante payoff is vs1 − c, and (ii) the buyers’ ex-ante payoffs
are zero. Therefore, (iii) the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero,
(iv) the ex-ante probability of the investment is σ˜ ∈ (0, 1), and (v) the ex-ante probability
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of trade is
vs1−c
vs1
. Furthermore, the probability that trade occurs within any given finite
period converges to zero as δ→ 1.
In this case too, the equilibrium is not unique in general, but we show that every
equilibrium exhibits properties (i) to (v).
Theorem 3 Suppose the buyers’ offers are public. Then every equilibrium satisfies the following
properties: (i) the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero, (ii) the ex-ante
probability of investment is
vs1−vb0
vb1−vb0
, and (iii) the ex-ante probability of trade is
vs1−c
vs1
.
Remark 1 It is straightforward to see that in comparison with the benchmark case G is smaller
and L is larger. As a result, now G = L because of the smaller values of pi0 and σ. The probability
the seller who has chonsen I = 0 will trade, i.e., pi0, is smaller because such a seller has no
incentive to accept a low offer, given that there are future sellers who might make a high offer. The
probability of investment is smaller because now buyers are indifferent between making (i) a high
offer that is accepted with probability one, i.e., vs1, and (ii) an offer that is rejected with probability
one, i.e., 0.
Remark 2 The possibility that the seller can trade with another buyer drives the bargaining
power of a particular buyer to zero. In fact, consider a game in which δ = 0 but the seller has all
the bargaining power. In other words, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer only once, and
the negotiation breaks down if the seller’s offer is not accepted. In such a game, there are multiple
equilibria because the seller can signal her own interim type. There is one equilibrium among
those in which (i) the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero, (ii) the seller invests
with probability
vs1−vb0
vb1−vb0
and offers vs1 with probability one irrespective of her investment decision,
and (iii) the buyer accepts the offer vs1 with probability
vs1−c
vs1
, and rejects any offer but vs1 with
probability one. It is clear that such an equilibrium has all the properties described in Theorem 2
and Theorem 3.
Remark 3 Recall that while the reservation value of the good to the seller who has chosen I = 1
is vs1, it is zero for the seller who has chosen I = 0. Suppose that the reservation value is
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exogenously given, and her reservation value is either vs1 with probability
vs1−vb0
vb1−vb0
, or zero with
probability 1− vs1−vb0
vb1−vb0
. Then there is an equilibrium in which b1 offers vs1 with probability one, and
the game ends at t = 1. In such an equilibrium, the payoff of the seller who has chosen I = 1 is
vs1 − c, which is exactly the same as her reservation value. On the other hand, the seller who has
chosen I = 0, whose reservation value is zero, receives vs1. Since trade occurs without delay, the
efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is positive.
However, in the game considered here, the seller’s reservation value is endogenous. Therefore,
the result described above fails to happen. If the seller knows that trade happens with probability
one or very close to one, the seller does not have much incentive to invest.
Remark 4 Suppose that there are only T buyers instead of infinite buyers. It is straightforward
to show that irrespective of the value of T, the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is
positive. This is because the T-th buyer has the bargaining power, and therefore, he gains from
trading with the seller who did not invest.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed a dynamic search model with endogenous quality choice
and showed that the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero if (i)
the common discounting is low, and (ii) the static incentive constraints preclude the
mutually agreeable ex-ante contract under which trade happens with probability one.
One implication of our result is that a lower search cost may not necessarily improve the
social welfare. To see this, compare the following three scenarios: (i) the case in which
the seller cannot meet with any buyer, so the search cost is extremely high; (ii) the case
in which the seller can negotiate with only one buyer, so the search cost is only slightly
high; and (iii) the case in which the seller can always negotiate with another buyer if
the negotiation fails, so the search cost is low. Note that while the social welfare under
case (iii) is the same as under case (i), the social welfare under case (ii) is strictly higher
than both cases (i) and (iii). In other words, a mildly high search cost induces higher
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social welfare than either a low or an extremely high search cost. As we have seen,
the reasoning behind this result is that a low search cost weakens the incentive for the
investment.
Our simple setting can be extended into various directions. Below, we briefly provide
several possible alternative specifications, and discuss how our results change. Future
directions for research are also discussed.
One difficulty that many search models have to deal with is the familiar Diamond’s
Paradox (Diamond (1971)). Diamond’s paradox is that inter-temporal competition among
buyers does nothing to increase the surplus of the seller when the time is discrete.
One may wonder if our result would be robust to the introduction of intra-temporal
competition. To see that it is, suppose that there are two buyers every period, and the
seller runs a second price auction with the reservation value vs1. Recall that no buyer earns
a positive payoff in the original equilibrium. Hence, we can construct an equilibrium
in which one buyer offers vs1 with probability α (δ), and the other buyer offers zero with
probability one every period. In this sense, our result is robust to the introduction of
intra-temporal competition. 5)
One may find our assumption that the investment can be made only at the beginning
of the game to be quite restrictive. If the seller can invest at the beginning of every period,
the moral hazard problem is more severe. Our result – that the efficiency gain created by
the possibility of trade is zero – still holds under the more severe moral hazard situation.
In fact, the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero even when there is
only one buyer (and the discount factor is large enough) because the seller never accepts
a low offer, i.e., pt < δ
(
vs1 − c
)
even if there is no future buyers. Our result shows that
even when the moral hazard problem is milder, trade cannot create any efficiency gain.
One of the crucial assumptions of our model is that buyers do not receive any private
or public signals. This is why the future-period buyers do not have any knowledge
5)This comes with one caveat, however. There is a continuum of equilibrium outcomes that are belief
driven. In fact, there are equilibria in which the efficiency gain is positive.
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that is superior to that of current-period buyer in our equilibrium. However, if we
consider the examples of the securitized loans or the start-up company, it is conceivable
that the market, i.e., potential buyers receive some public information – e.g., profitability,
performance, or customer base – as time goes by.6) In contrast, if we consider the housing
owner example, it is conceivable that each potential buyer receives a private signal.
Some of the equilibrium properties of our result still holds even when the buyers
receive some signal. For example, the seller never invests with probability one. The
ex-ante probability that trade occurs is positive, but not one.
When the signals are public, buyers gradually learn whether the seller has invested
or not. Therefore, it is conceivable that the efficiency gain created by the possibility of
trade is positive. But this is not necessarily the case when the signals are private because
the following form of information cascade may occur: if the first few buyers receive bad
signals and therefore decide not to buy the good, then all the following future buyers
may rationally ignore their private signals. Note that such a cascade never occur when
the signals are public. Therefore, if the seller invests with the same probability as when
the signals are public, it may be the case that the ex-ante probability of trade is lower.
That in turn implies that the seller has more incentive to invest at the beginning of the
game. Therefore, the welfare comparison of the different types of signals is intricate.
Whether or not such a cascade occurs may depend on if the offers are public or private
as well. Extending our model in this direction would be a valuable question to explore
in future research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We solve the game by backward induction. Let σ be the probability that the seller makes
the investment. The belief of b1 on σ is denoted by σˆ. It is straightforward to see that
6)See Daley and Green (2010) for the exogenous-type case.
17
b1 offers either 0 or vs1. The buyer’s optimal offer depends on her belief σˆ. The payoffs
from offering vs1 and 0 are σˆv
b
1 + (1 − σˆ) vb0 − vs1 and (1 − σˆ) vb0, respectively. Let σ¯ = vs1/vb1.
If σˆ > σ¯, then b1 offers p = vs1 with probability one. On the other hand, if σˆ < σ¯, his offer
is p = 0 with probability one. If σˆ = σ¯, then b1 is indifferent between offering 0 and vs1.
We show that there is no equilibrium with σˆ , σ¯. To see this, first suppose σˆ > σ¯. If
the seller chooses I = 0, the her payoff is vs1. On the other hand, if she chooses I = 1,
her payoff is vs1 − c < vs1. Therefore, the seller deviates to σ = 0, which is a contradiction.
Next suppose σˆ < σ¯. If the seller chooses I = 0, then her payoffs is 0. On the other hand,
the seller can always earn vs1 − c > 0 by choosing I = 1. Therefore, the seller deviates to
σ = 1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if there is an equilibrium, the seller chooses I = 1 with probability σ¯ and
I = 0 with probability 1 − σ¯. When the seller takes such a strategy, b1 is indifferent
between offering p = vs0 and v
s
1. Let α be the probability that the buyer offers p = v
s
1. If
α =
(
vs1 − c
)
/vs1, the ex-ante expected payoffs of choosing I = 0 and I = 1 are αv
s
1 = v
s
1 − c
and vs1 − c, respectively. Hence, the seller is in fact indifferent between I = 0 and 1.
The seller’s ex-ante payoff is vs1−c. Therefore, the buyer’s ex-ante payoff corresponds
to E, which is (1 − σ∗) vb0. Q.E.D.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let σ∗ be the probability that the seller makes chooses I = 1.
Claim 1 bt never offers pt > vs1.
Proof. This follows from the facts that bt+n never offers pt+n > vb1, and therefore the seller
who has chosen I = 1 accepts any offer pt ≥ max
{
δnvb1, v
s
1
}
at t. In addition, vs1 is accepted
by the sellers with I = 0 and I = 1 with probability one.
Claim 2 If vs1 will be offered with probability one at t, then µt = µt−1.
Proof. If vs1 is offered with probability one at t, then the seller who has chosen I = 0
rejects any offer pt ≤ vb0 at t − 1 because vb0 < δvs1. Therefore, µt−1 = µt.
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Claim 3 In any equilibrium, µt = σ˜ for all t.
Proof. Consider bt with belief µt. If he were to make an offer that will be accepted only
by the seller who has chosen I = 0, then the highest possible payoff for him would be(
1 − µt) vb0 − 0. Therefore, bt offers vs1 with probability one when µtvb1 + (1 − µt) vb0 − vs1 >(
1 − µt) vb0, i.e. µt > m1 ≡ vs1vb1 .
Then by Claim 2, µt ≤ m1 for all t in any equilibrium. Otherwise, µ1 > m1, and then
p1 = vs1 with probability one. If this is the case, however, then the seller never invests, a
contradiction.
Now consider bt with belief µt ≤ m1. If he were to make an offer that will be accepted
only by the seller who has chosen I = 0, then the highest possible payoff for him would
be
(
m1 − µt) vb0 − 0. Therefore, bt offers vs1 with probability one if µtvb1 + (1 − µt) vb0 − vs1 >(
m1 − µt) vb0, i.e., µt > m2, where m2 solves m2vb1 + (1 −m2) vb0− vs1 = (m1 −m2) vb0. Note that
m2 < m1. Then by Claim 2 again, µt ≤ m2 for all t in any equilibrium.
Applying the argument sequentially, we can show that for any t, bt offers vs1 with
probability one if µt > mn, where mn solves the following recurrence formula:
mnvb1 + (1 −mn) vb0 − vs1 > (mn−1 −mn) vb0.
Since mn > mn+1, and limn→∞mn = σ˜, we know that µt ≤ σ˜ for all t.
We are done if we show that µ1 = σ˜ since µt is weakly increasing. Suppose that
µ1 < σ˜. Then, the maximum payoff of the seller who has chosen I = 0 is vb0. However, by
choosing I = 1, she can earn vs1 − c, a contradiction.
Claim 4 In any equilibrium, the efficiency gain created by the possibility of trade is zero.
Proof. Note that µt = µt+1 = σ˜ by Claim 3. Therefore bt’s offer is either (i) accepted by
both the sellers with I = 0 and I = 1, i.e., pt = vs1 or (ii) rejected by both. In either case,
bt’s payoff is zero. The seller’s ex-ante payoff is vs1 − c. Therefore, the claim follows.
Claim 5 In any equilibrium, the ex-ante probability of trade is
vs1−c
vs1
.
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Proof. The seller is indifferent between investing and not investing. Furthermore, trade
occurs if and only if vs1 is offered. Therefore, the ex-ante probability of trade has to be
vs1−c
vs1
.
Q.E.D.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Claim 6 If µt > σ˜, then bt offers vs1 with probability one independent of the history.
Proof. Recall mn defined in Claim 3. If µt > m1, then bt offers vs1 with probability one.
Suppose bt has belief µt ≤ m1. Then bt’s offer cannot lead to a posterior µt+1 > m1. If it
can, then µt+1 > µt implies that the seller who has chosen I = 0 accepts some offer pt ≤ vb0
with a positive probability. However, if the seller who has chosen I = 0 rejects such an
offer, she can increase her payoff to δvs1, a contradiction. Therefore, the highest possible
payoff from an offer that will be accepted only by the seller who has chosen I = 0 is(
m1 − µt) vb0. Therefore, if µt > m2, then bt offers vs1 with probability one.
Repeating the same argument, we can show that if µt > mn, then bt offers vs1 with
probability one. Since limn→∞mn = σ˜, we obtain the result.
Claim 7 In any equilibrium, µt = σ˜ for all t.
Proof. By Claim 6, we know that µ1 ≤ σ˜. But if µ1 < σ˜, then the highest possible
payoff for the seller who has chosen I = 0 is vb0. Then she prefers to choose I = 1, a
contradiction. Therefore µ1 = σ˜. Since it is straightforward to see that there is no history
such µt+1 > µt = σ˜ for some t, we are done.
The rest of the proof is the same as Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
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